Bank Detail Change Fraud

What it means

Bank detail change fraud targets the single most dangerous moment in the payment cycle: the point where an account number is updated. A criminal, posing as a known supplier or an employee, sends a routine looking request to change where money should be paid. Once the change is accepted, every future payment flows to the fraudster until someone notices the money never arrived. A familiar Australian example is an accounts payable inbox receiving an email from a “long-standing supplier” advising they have switched banks, complete with a new BSB and account number, days before a scheduled run. Nothing about the request looks urgent or suspicious, which is precisely why it works.

Why it matters for Australian finance teams

A changed account can quietly reroute months of invoices, so a single accepted request can cause repeated losses. Payment redirection and false billing scams cost Australian businesses tens of millions of dollars a year according to the ACCC and Scamwatch, and recovery is rare once funds are withdrawn. Teams that update the vendor master file on the strength of an email alone have no independent proof the new account genuinely belongs to the supplier.

How ezyshield helps

ezyshield treats any change of details as a trigger, not a formality. Before a payment is authorised it confirms the person, the business via ABN and ASIC records, and that the payee owns the nominated account, and it automatically re-verifies whenever those details change. A fraudulent new account cannot silently replace a trusted one, and every check is written to an append-only audit trail. See how it works and bank account ownership verification.